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 Chapter 10 
 UK: Large-Scale European Migration 
and the Challenge to EU Free Movement 
 Alessio  D’Angelo and  Eleonore  Kofman 
10.1  Introduction 
 International migration to the UK in the post-war years had typically concerned 
post-colonial migrants and then, in the 1990s, asylum seekers: both groups were 
third country nationals. Although there had been immigration of displaced people 
from Eastern Europe in the 1940s, and some sizeable fl ows of Italian workers in the 
1950s–1960s, there was no equivalent of the guest worker fl ows in continental 
Europe. European immigration grew steadily in the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless 
it only became visible and a major political issue following Eastern enlargement of 
the EU in 2004 and the UK’s opening up without a transitionary period as in most 
other states. Hostility to immigration has always been present, even when levels 
were relatively low (Park et al. 2012), but the large-scale post accession migration 
has once again pushed immigration to the top of the agenda, bolstered by the emer-
gence of a far right party – the UK Independence Party – portrayed as respectable 
unlike the earlier British National Party. 
 In this chapter we argue that Eastern European migration has reframed the debate 
on migration in the UK and led to calls for restrictions on free movement and access 
to welfare. As Southern European immigration grew, it began to be targeted and 
used as grounds for restrictions towards EU free movement. We also ask to what 
extent the recent arrivals from Southern Europe resemble the Eastern European 
migrants of the early 2000s, who were young and fi lled labour demand in less 
skilled occupations, often in areas and regions which had not experienced signifi -
cant immigration in the last few decades. 
 In the fi rst section we set out the current socio-economic situation which, though 
with higher levels of unemployment than during the boom years, has continued to 
be based on a demand for migrants. We then outline the migratory dynamics and 
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socio-demographic characteristics of Eastern European and, particularly, Southern 
European fl ows. In the second part we turn to the debates that have emerged as a 
result of the changing migratory landscape and the implications this will have for 
the new and highly educated Southern European migrants who have been increas-
ingly attracted to the UK as the economic crisis hits their own countries. 
10.2  Socio-economic Situation of the Country 
 A few months after the start of the recession in 2008, UK unemployment started to 
rise sharply. When the global fi nancial crisis hit, the unemployment rate was a little 
over 5 % or 1.6 million. However, in 2009, it reached 7.5 %, to then peak at 8.1 % in 
2011. This was the highest level since the early 1990s – but still about 2 percentage 
points below the European average. The economy has improved since 2012 and the 
unemployment rate has fallen to 6.4 % for April–June 2014. 
 Over the same period of time, youth unemployment also reached an historically 
high level, rising from 15 % in 2008 to 21.3 % in 2011. Though decreasing as with 
adult employment, it remains much higher at 16.9 % for the period April–June 
2014. As elsewhere, the young have borne the brunt of austerity measures and the 
increasing use of insecure work contracts. The diffi culties in obtaining full-time, 
stable employment have made it more diffi cult for them to live independently of 
their parents, which has been exacerbated by the shortage of affordable housing. In 
terms of gender differences, female unemployment has historically been lower than 
for men. This gap was particularly pronounced in 2011 (male unemployment: 8.7 %; 
female unemployment: 7.4 %); however male unemployment has improved more 
rapidly (6.6 % in April–June 2014, against 6.2 % among women), in part because of 
the large scale loss of public sector jobs. 
 During the 2010–2013 period, the unemployment rate among foreign-born 
workers – which since the early 1990s had been slightly higher than among UK-born 
ones (Rienzo  2014 )- registered a widening of the gender gap. Whilst the level of 
unemployment amongst migrant men converged with the natives, the rates among 
migrant women increased compared to UK-born women. 
 Although overall unemployment rates have risen and the number of jobs avail-
able are less than at the peak of Eastern European immigration almost a decade ago, 
the economy still relies on migrant labour across a range of sectors and skills. 
Between January and March 2014, the UK employed 447,000 more UK born and 
292,000 non-UK born workers compared to the same quarter of 2013 (ONS  2014 ). 
The Migration Advisory Committee ( 2014 ) – an independent body to the govern-
ment – suggests that the demand for migrant workers in the UK is infl uenced by a 
broad range of institutions and public policies, such as low level of labour market 
regulation in some sectors, lack of investment in education and training, low wages 
and poor conditions in some publicly-funded sector jobs, poor job status and career 
tracks, and low-waged agency work. Moreover, a large number of zero-hours con-
tracts, that is without fi xed hours from week to week, has been created in recent 
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years. These give no stability or ability to plan ahead for the worker. The Offi ce for 
National Statistics recently estimated that employers held 1.4 million contracts with 
workers that did not guarantee a minimum number of hours. The UK came to be 
seen as “the self-employment capital of western Europe” (IPPR  2014a ). Two-fi fths 
of all new jobs created since 2010 were self-employed; the incomes of these work-
ers have fallen to a much greater extent than of those in regular employment (14 % 
compared with 9 %). 
 Examples of the high use of migrant workers include the construction sector, 
where increased migrant labour may be the consequence of inadequate vocational 
training, or the care sector, characterised by low wages, lack of training and rapid 
turnover (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). At the skilled level, cuts in training places in 
healthcare arising from reduced budgets for the National Health Service (NHS) 
have resulted in renewed shortages, as with nurses who have been recruited from 
Portugal and Spain as well as non-EU countries such as the Philippines (Donnelly 
and Dominiczak  2014 ). 
10.3  Migratory Dynamics and Volume of Flows 
from Southern Europe 
 The UK’s patterns of immigration have been distinctive compared to other European 
countries. It had traditionally relied on fl ows from its former colonies in the 
Caribbean, South Asia and Ireland, whilst the fl ows of immigrants from the rest of 
Europe have been limited and much lower than those experienced, for example, by 
countries such as Germany, France or Belgium. Migration from Southern Europe, 
in particular, had been numerically limited in the post-war years, with the exception 
of a moderately steady infl ow of Italian workers during the 1950s and 1960s 
(D’Angelo  2007 ; King  1977 ). These migrants, for the most part coming from 
Southern Italy, settled in industrial towns such as Peterborough, Nottingham, 
Coventry, Sheffi eld and Bedford (attracted by the local brick-making industry). 
 If the 1970s and 1980s were mainly characterised by a limited number of 
European migrants, including young people coming to study or for short work expe-
riences as well as highly skilled professionals, from the 1990s intra-European 
migration became increasingly more signifi cant. Between the 1991 and 2001 cen-
suses, the number of French-born residents increased by 80 %, the Spanish by 41 %, 
the Dutch by 35 %, and the Italians by 17 %. Already in this decade the UK became 
the preferred destination for Southern Europeans. Morgan ( 2004 : 102), writing 
about the 1990s, suggested that in relation to the Spanish, this was due to the cre-
ation of freedom of mobility, the abolition of work permits, cheap travel, higher 
educational levels of young Spaniards, buoyancy of the British labour market, com-
paratively higher levels of unemployment in Spain, and the continuing rise of 
English as the lingua franca of the business community. More and more profession-
als, especially in education and health care, came to fi ll shortages in the labour 
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market for which there was active recruitment, especially of nurses. There was a 
distinct increase in professionals amongst migrants from Southern European coun-
tries from 19.4 % in 1992 to 26.6 % in 2000 and a sharp decline in manual workers 
from 62.5 % to 45 % in the same period. About 43 % of females and 38 % of men 
had a tertiary degree (Morgan  2004 : 140). Another trend had been the increasing 
proportion of female migrants to over 50 % from a number of European countries. 
 The accession of ten new countries to the EU in 2004 reshaped European migra-
tion patterns. The UK was one of three countries (in addition to Ireland and Sweden) 
which immediately opened up to the accession states, without imposing any transi-
tory restriction. This was seen as a means of reorienting migratory supply for low 
skilled labour away from UK’s traditional sources such as Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Non-EU migrants were restricted to skilled labour markets which would be man-
aged through a Points Based System fully implemented in 2008. As spelled out by 
the Home Offi ce in its  Controlling our Borders paper (2005: 21), “migrants must be 
as economically active as possible; put as little burden on the state as possible; and 
be as socially integrated as possible”. 
 Thus between May 2004 and September 2008, 932,000 people from the EU-8 
(for the most part Poles) registered initial applications under the ‘Worker Registration 
Scheme’ especially set-up by the British government to keep track of new employ-
ees from the new EU member states. The total number of those moving to the UK 
was in fact much higher, given that, for example, self-employed workers were not 
required to register (Pollard et al.  2008 : 9). Still, the WRS fi gures were well above 
the original offi cial estimates, which had been for as little as 13,000 per annum. This 
was in part due to the restrictions imposed by most other European countries, which 
led to a large-scale immigration to Ireland and the UK. It created the idea that it was 
impossible to forecast accurately future fl ows and was used subsequently in heated 
debates about how many Bulgarians and Romanians would enter after the end of the 
transition period in 2014 (Migration Observatory  2014 ). 
 In the meantime, the number of A8 workers registering had by 2008 sharply 
declined due to improvements in their economies and decreasing levels of unem-
ployment, declining value of the pound, and the opening up of other EU countries 
to EU8 migrants as from 2006. It was also estimated that about half the arrivals 
between 2004 and 2007 had returned home (Pollard et al.  2008 ). Nonetheless, the 
entry into the labour market of Bulgarians and Romanians following their accession 
was restricted since the A8 were seen as already having fi lled labour shortages 
whilst raising concerns about the impact they had on public services and wages (see 
Sect.  10.5 on “Policies and Debates”). 
 As we have noted, the UK has been a preferred destination for Southern European 
migrants since the 1990s (Gonzalez-Ferrer  2013 ; McMahon  2012 ) but for the period 
1991–2003 net-migration from other EU countries to the UK was very small. This 
contrasts with an average annual net-migration from non-EU countries to the UK of 
over 100,000 migrants for the same period (Migration Observatory  2014 ). However, 
the numbers of those entering for work has increased sharply in the 2010s. 
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 According to the latest Census, in 2011 there were over 7.5 million foreign-born 
(i.e. non-UK) residents in the whole of England and Wales. 1 Of these – as shown in 
Table  10.1 – about 2 million were EU-born and in particular 135,000 were from 
Italy, 88,000 from Portugal, 79,000 from Spain and 35,000 from Greece. The total 
number of Southern European residents (336,353) increased by over 50 % since the 
previous 2001 Census; however the trend has been very different across different 
groups. On the one hand, Greek-born residents have gone up by a mere 3.5 % over 
a decade, whilst over the same period of time Portuguese have increased by 145.8 %, 
Spanish by 53.6 % and Italians by 32 %.
 Breaking down the Census data by year of arrival confi rms the migratory history 
described above. Of all EU-born people living in England and Wales in 2011, 25.4 % 
arrived before 1991, 19.2 % in the 1990s and 55.4 % between 2004 and 2011. The 
proportion of Southern European residents arriving in the latter recent period is 
signifi cantly smaller – for example 31.6 % among Italians. Unlike other European 
countries, the UK does not have a system of compulsory registration of residents, 
thus the best estimate of resident population in a given year – beyond the Census 
data collected every 10 years – is given by the Annual Population Survey (APS), a 
yearly dataset combining results from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) with a num-
1  These detailed Census data are available for England and Wales only rather than for the United 
Kingdom as a whole – i.e. Scotland and Northern Ireland, which together represent over 10 % of 
the UK population, are not included. 
 Table 10.1  Population in England and Wales by country of birth 
 2001 (census)  2011 (census) 
 % change 
2001–2011  2013 (APS)  CI +/− 
 % change 
2011–
2013 
 All countries  52,041,916  56,075,912  7.8 %  55,595,000  388 k  −0.9 % 
 UK  47,406,411  48,570,902  2.5 %  48,254,000  363 k  −0.7 % 
 Non UK  4,635,505  7,505,010  61.9 %  7,341,000  …  −2.2 % 
 Non EU  3,953,829  5,469,391  38.3 %  4,944,000  …  −9.6 % 
 EU*  681,676  2,035,619  n.a.  2,397,000  …  17.8 % 
 A8  n.a .  882 , 748  n.a .  936 , 000  …  6.0 % 
  Poland  58,107  579,121  896.6 %  581,000  39 k  0.3 % 
 A2  n.a .  125 , 580  n.a .  176 , 000  …  40.1 % 
  Bulgaria  n.a.  45,893  n.a.  49,000  11 k  6.8 % 
  Romania  7,203  79,687  1006.3 %  127,000  18 k  59.4 % 
 South 
Europe 
 222 , 674  336 , 353  51.1 %  355 , 000  …  5.5 % 
  Greece  33,224  34,389  3.5 %  35,000  9 k  1.8 % 
  Italy  102,020  134,619  32.0 %  134,000  19 k  −0.5 % 
  Portugal  35,867  88,161  145.8 %  103,000  17 k  16.8 % 
  Spain  51,563  79,184  53.6 %  83,000  14 k  4.8 % 
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ber of regional ‘boosts’. The APS data for 2013 – see Table  10.2 – show a further 
increase of residents born in Southern Europe, against an overall population which 
appears almost unchanged. 2 
 A good estimate of the most recent fl ows is offered by the offi cial statistics on 
National Insurance Number (NINo) registrations. Under the UK system, a NINo 
registration is generally required by any overseas national looking to work or claim 
benefi ts or tax credits. Figure  10.1 , which include NINo yearly data between 2012 
and 2013, clearly shows a dramatic increase of registration by Spanish, Italian and 
Portuguese migrants, particularly since 2011, with an annual infl ow almost qua-
drupled over the decade. Overall, NINo registrations from Southern European coun-
2  The confi dence interval for the four Southern European populations is between ±9,000 and 
±19,000; thus the minor changes indicated in Table  10.2 should be read with caution. 
 Table 10.2  NiNo registrations – top 20 nationalities (years ending June) 
 Year to June 
2010 
 Year to June 
2013 
 Year to June 
2014 
 % change 
2010–2014 
 Total  604,347  572,876  565,719  −6.4 % 
 European Union  284,822  398,027  420,646  47.7 % 
 EU Accession States  187,328  213,893  248,852  32.8 % 
 Non European 
Union 
 318,930  174,427  144,181  −54.8 % 
 Top 20 nationalities 
 Poland  68,721  96,481  91,561  33.2 % 
 Romania  17,040  17,688  63,432  272.3 % 
 Spain  15 , 084  47 , 320  41 , 065  172.2 % 
 Italy  15 , 341  35 , 834  38 , 534  151.2 % 
 India  82,156  30,781  25,916  −68.5 % 
 Portugal  10 , 177  26 , 126  24 , 135  137.2 % 
 Bulgaria  11,784  9,986  21,593  83.2 % 
 Hungary  11,923  25,215  20,233  69.7 % 
 France  17,254  21,900  20,022  16.0 % 
 Rep of Lithuania  27,377  26,611  19,341  −29.4 % 
 Rep of Ireland  11,155  15,829  14,779  32.5 % 
 Pakistan  26,761  15,295  10,683  −60.1 % 
 Slovak Rep  12,837  11,686  10,676  −16.8 % 
 China Peoples Rep  12,878  11,843  10,067  −21.8 % 
 Rep of Latvia  25,868  13,257  9,594  −62.9 % 
 Nigeria  16,722  10,389  9,575  −42.7 % 
 Germany  10,966  10,978  9,448  −13.8 % 
 Australia  13,203  11,638  9,146  −30.7 % 
 Greece  2 , 415  8 , 957  8 , 303  243.8 % 
 Czech Rep  7,901  8,435  7,909  0.1 % 
 Others  186,784  116,627  99,707  −46.6 % 
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tries represented about one fi fth of all overseas registrations in 2012–2013, compared 
to less than 10 % between 2002 and 2010.
 As shown in Table  10.2 , in the fi rst half of 2014 Spanish, Italian and Portuguese 
registrations were among the top 6 groups: respectively with 41,000, 38,500 and 
24,000 new registrations. 3 These yearly values are around one and a half times 
higher than those registered in 2010 (during the same period, the number of yearly 
registrations from the EU as a whole increased only by 50 %, whilst the overall 
number of overseas registrations has slightly decreased). 
10.3.1  Secondary Migration 
 It is diffi cult to establish the exact degree of secondary migration, which includes 
two categories: that of citizens of another EU country and third country nationals. 
The UK has been a popular destination for TCNs gaining citizenship in another 
country, for example, Somalis from Netherlands and Sweden (Lindley and van Hear 
3  A change to the process of recording NINOs during the quarter April to June 2014, means that the 
volume of NINo registrations recorded is lower in this quarter than would otherwise be the case 
(estimated to be around 15–25 % lower in the quarter April to June 2014 and 2–5 % lower for the 
year to June 2014). Hence, comparisons of NINo registrations for the latest periods should be 













 Fig. 10.1  NiNo registrations of Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish nationals (2002–2013) 
(Source: Authors’ data analysis of Department for Work and Pensions data: adult overseas nation-
als registering for a National Insurance number for the purposes of work, benefi ts or tax credits) 
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 2007 ; van Liempt  2011 ). Some migrant rights organisations, such as Latin American 
Women’s Rights Services, report an increasing number of Spanish citizens of Latin 
American origin coming for advice and living in very poor housing conditions. It is 
also likely that this population may have different socio-economic characteristics 
than many of the highly educated young Spaniards. Amongst the Portuguese too 
there are many born in former colonies such as Brazil. 
 In relation to the mobility of third country nationals, a European Migration 
Network study ( 2013 ) notes that there are limited relevant statistics and lack of com-
parability. However, existing evidence suggests an increasing trend. In the UK, the 
long-term migration of non-EU citizens whose country of last residence was the EU, 
migrating for all reasons, appears to have increased by some 200 %, from approxi-
mately 1,000 in 2007 to 3,000 in 2011. At the same time it was estimated that long-
term migration of EU citizens had declined from 154,000 in 2007 to 147,000 in 2011 
(EMN 2012:11). Thus the percentage of third-country mobility in relation to the 
overall intra-European mobility of both groups has increased from 0.6 % in 2007 to 
2 % in 2011. We also know that the number of those applying for work permits from 
third country nationals residing in another member state rose from 2,940 in 2008 to 
3,320 in 2010 but then fell to 2,560 in 2011, the fi rst full year of the Conservative-led 
coalition government (EMN  2013 : 55). Indians constituted the single largest group. 
 By cross-tabulating 2011 Census data by country of birth and nationality, it 
appears there are signifi cant numbers of people with Italian, Portuguese and Spanish 
passports who were born in countries different from their citizenship. In particular, 
27 % of UK residents with a Portuguese passport were born in a non-European 
country (14 % in Africa and 6 % in India), some of whom may have been born in 
overseas Portuguese territories before de-colonisation. The proportion of non- 
European born is 15 % for Italian citizens and 12 % for Spanish ones. 
 It should be noted that the UK has opted out of the major Directives facilitating 
the mobility of third country nationals such as that regarding third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents (Directive 2003/109/EC); that on third-country national 
holders of an EU Blue Card for highly qualifi ed employment in one Member State 
(Directive 2009/50/EC); those for researchers (Directive 2005/71/EC); and students 
(Directive 2004/114/EC) (EMN  2013 :19). 
10.4  Socio-demographic Characteristics and Labour Market 
Inclusion 
 According to the 2013 Annual Population Survey estimates, UK residents born in 
Southern Europe appear fairly balanced in terms of gender, with an estimated 48.6 % 
females among Italians, 49.5 % among Portuguese and 55.4 % among Spaniards. 
Interestingly, the NINo (2013) data on most recent arrivals suggest a reduction of 
the female component (see Table  10.3 below) with, for example, only 40 % of 
women among new entries from Italy. In terms of age, these recent fl ows – not sur-
prisingly – appear fairly young, with about 80 % of new registered workers from 
Italy and Spain being aged between 18 and 34 years and only 6 % aged 45 or over. 
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The picture is however somewhat different for Portuguese migrant workers: with 
64 % aged between 18 and 34, 21 % aged 35–44 and 13 % aged over 45 years.
 The areas of settlement of Southern European migrants follow the broader pat-
tern of all non-UK and non-EU residents, with about 40–45 % living in the areas of 
Greater London and about 15 % in the South East of England and the others fairly 
spread across the rest of the country. The role of London as the main pole of attrac-
tion for Southern European migrants appears to have increased in recent years. 
Among Italians in particular, 68.9 % of those who registered for a NiNo in 2013 
were based in London. The data for the same year shows 51 % of Spanish and 
44.2 % of Portuguese new arrivals working in the capital. 
 Detailed information about labour market participation are available from the 
Labour Force Survey. The data from the second quarter of 2014 shows very differ-
ent profi les for the four Southern European populations (see Table  10.4 below). 
Italian-born, with an activity rate comparable with that of the UK-born population, 
has a much smaller unemployment rate: 3.7 % against 6.0 %, whilst for Spanish- 
born the unemployment rate is exactly the same as among the native population 
(with a slightly higher activity rate). For those born in Portugal and Greece, how-
ever, the registered unemployment rate is around 8.5 % or 2 percentage points above 
the national average; interestingly, these two groups have also a much smaller pro-
portion of inactive population (about 20 % compared to a national average of 40 %).
 When compared to the latest Census data, these sample-based LFS fi gures sug-
gest a signifi cant reduction in the unemployment rate among Italian-born residents 
(5.2 % in 2011; 1.5 percentage points higher) but very little change among 
Portuguese-born (8.2 % in 2011). Finally, the Census data by year of arrival reveals 
much lower unemployment rates among those who have been living in the UK for a 
long time. Among Italian-born, the rate is just around 3 % for those who fi rst arrived 
before the 1970s and between 4.5 and 5.5 % for those arriving in the 1970s–1990s. 
 Similar differences between groups are found when looking at the data by type 
of occupation (Table  10.5 ). The proportion of Italians working as managers and 
senior offi cials (14.8 %) is signifi cantly higher than the national average (10 %) and 
the proportion of professionals (31.2 %) is over 10 percentage points above the aver-
age. As for Spanish workers, if the proportion of managers (8.1 %) is slightly above 
 Table 10.3  NiNo registrations (2013) by country of birth, age and gender 
 Italy  Spain  Portugal 
 #  Age%  F%  #  Age%  F%  #  Age%  F% 
 <18  354  1 %  46 %  374  1 %  51 %  612  2 %  47 % 
 18–24  18,444  42 %  42 %  17,503  34 %  51 %  8,217  27 %  50 % 
 25–34  17,215  39 %  42 %  23,546  46 %  47 %  11,083  37 %  43 % 
 35–44  5,277  12 %  34 %  7,243  14 %  41 %  6,205  21 %  39 % 
 45–54  2,269  5 %  29 %  2,544  5 %  39 %  2,788  9 %  41 % 
 55–59  343  1 %  31 %  364  1 %  40 %  632  2 %  46 % 
 >60  218  0 %  37 %  172  0 %  60 %  593  2 %  51 % 
 Total  44,120  100 %  41 %  51,746  100 %  47 %  30,130  100 %  44 % 
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the average, those working in ‘professional occupations’ are over 42 %: more than 
double the national average. At the other end of the spectrum, only 3.9 % of 
Portuguese-born workers are in the top group, whilst the proportion of those in 
‘elementary occupations’ (32.6 %) is almost three times the national average. Thus 
the different nationalities exhibit different insertions into the labour market. Italians 
in particular have a high proportion working in the managerial and professional 
groups (1–3) together with high levels in low level service employment but negli-
gible in manufacturing, a pattern quite distinct to that of the Portuguese and the 
Polish.
 Furthermore, a comparison with the 2011 Census data suggests an increase of 
the proportion of Italians working in the top 3 categories of about 5 percentage 
points. The Census data can also be broken down by year of arrival, revealing that 
the most recent Italian migrants are those more likely to work as managers or pro-
fessionals: between 30 and 40 % of those who arrived up to the early 1980s, against 
over 55 % for those who arrived in the 1990s, 2000s and, again, 2010s. Conversely, 
the proportion of Portuguese migrants in the top categories is between 20 and 30 % 
 Table 10.4  Population by country of birth and economic activity (LFS 2q2014) 
 In employment  Unemployed  Inactive  Unemployment rate  Activity rate 
 UK  58.6 %  3.8 %  37.6 %  6.0 %  62.4 % 
 Non UK  63.2 %  5.0 %  31.9 %  7.3 %  68.1 % 
 Greece  74.7 %  7.1 %  18.2 %  8.6 %  81.8 % 
 Italy  62.6 %  2.4 %  35.0 %  3.7 %  65.0 % 
 Portugal  73.0 %  6.8 %  20.2 %  8.5 %  79.8 % 
 Spain  65.7 %  4.2 %  30.1 %  6.0 %  69.9 % 
 Total  59.3 %  3.9 %  36.8 %  6.2 %  63.2 % 
 Table 10.5  Population by country of birth and occupation (LFS 2q2014) 
 UK  Non UK  Greece  Italy  Portugal  Spain  Total 
 1  10.2 %  9.1 %  1.9 %  14.8 %  3.9 %  8.1 %  10.0 % 
 2  19.3 %  22.8 %  45.8 %  31.2 %  22.9 %  42.2 %  19.9 % 
 3  14.7 %  10.4 %  20.9 %  10.3 %  2.9 %  11.9 %  14.0 % 
 4  11.2 %  7.6 %  11.3 %  8.4 %  3.6 %  6.7 %  10.7 % 
 5  11.3 %  9.0 %  3.9 %  7.1 %  9.0 %  2.2 %  10.9 % 
 6  9.3 %  9.7 %  3.0 %  4.3 %  8.2 %  8.2 %  9.4 % 
 7  8.1 %  6.3 %  6.8 %  7.2 %  5.9 %  6.5 %  7.8 % 
 8  5.9 %  8.2 %  0.0 %  0.0 %  11.0 %  2.1 %  6.3 % 
 9  10.0 %  16.8 %  6.4 %  16.6 %  32.6 %  12.2 %  11.0 % 
 Total  25,684,348  4,775,419  35,684  85,633  70,724  68,949  30,459,767 
 Note: 1 ‘Managers, Directors And Senior Offi cials’; 2 ‘Professional Occupations’; 3 ‘Associate 
Professional And Technical Occupations’; 4 ‘Administrative And Secretarial Occupations’; 5 
‘Skilled Trades Occupations’; 6 ‘Caring, Leisure And Other Service Occupations’; 7 ‘Sales And 
Customer Service Occupations’; 8 ‘Process, Plant And Machine Operatives’; 9 ‘Elementary 
Occupations’ 
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for each decade of arrival from the 1960s to date (Detailed 2011 Census data for 
Spanish migrants is not available). 
 The distribution by occupational status is partially refl ected by the data on the 
highest qualifi cation of workers (Table  10.6 ). In particular, among Italian and 
Spanish-born people, the proportions of those with tertiary education – respectively 
62.5 % and 70.7 % – are almost double the UK national average (35.1 %). On the 
other hand, Portuguese-born have a lower than average proportion of people with 
tertiary and secondary education and a proportion of those reportedly with no quali-
fi cation which is much higher than all other Southern European countries.
 Unlike the abundant literature on immigration from the accession countries, and 
in particular Poland (Ciupijus  2011 ; Ryan et al.  2008 ; Sumption and Somerville 
 2010 ), there is little published academic research on recent and very recent Southern 
European fl ows. Since late 2012, there have been a number of journalistic accounts 
with titles such as ‘PIGS do fl y’ (PIGS = Portuguese, Italians, Greeks, Spanish) 
(The Economist  2013 ) and the ‘Return of the Spanish Armada’ (The Daily Telegraph 
2013). These tend to focus on Southern European migrants working in low skilled 
jobs in the hospitality, retail and construction sectors, but as the quantitative data 
presented in this chapter show, many have managed to fi nd jobs commensurate with 
their education and training. National media has generally represented the young 
Southern Europeans as forced to fl ee their countries because of lack of opportunities 
in a fairly favourable light. In some cases – like in the above mentioned report by 
the Economist – they are presented as unlikely to remain for long due to their pur-
ported strong attachment to family and thus not likely to make claims on public 
services such as schools for their children. In reality, research evidence on their 
migration plans and family circumstances is missing (see Chap.  6 by Bermudez and 
Brey on Spain in this volume where they comment on the gap between Spanish data 
on emigration and UK data on immigration). It should also be noted that there is a 
tendency by British journalists (The Economist  2013 ) to present a somewhat inac-
curate history of Spanish migrants, stating that they are predisposed not to migrate 
except in the early Franco years, thus erasing the earlier European fl ows of the 
1960s to France, Germany and Switzerland. However, as we shall see in the follow-
 Table 10.6  Population by country of birth and qualifi cation (LFS 2q2014) 
 UK  Non UK  Greece  Italy  Portugal  Spain  Total 
 Tertiary  33.1 %  46.1 %  78.0 %  62.5 %  29.3 %  70.7 %  35.1 % 
 Secondary  47.9 %  23.2 %  9.5 %  17.7 %  29.3 %  12.1 %  44.0 % 
 Other  7.9 %  19.7 %  8.0 %  14.9 %  29.0 %  12.7 %  9.7 % 
 No qualif.  10.1 %  10.4 %  4.4 %  2.2 %  12.0 %  3.9 %  10.1 % 
 Did not 
know 
 1.1 %  0.7 %  0.0 %  2.7 %  0.3 %  0.7 %  1.0 % 
 Total  37,349,283  7,003,680  47,207  118,458  91,332  97,320  44,352,963 
 Note: Tertiary: degree, higher education or equivalent; Secondary: GCE, A-level, GCSE grades 
A*-C or equivalent 
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ing section, the growing hostility towards EU immigration, and more generally the 
EU, means that the conditionalities being proposed will affect all EU migrants. 
10.5  Policies and Debates 
 The debate about immigration and ensuing policies needs to be placed within a very 
rapid growth of intra European migration although, as we shall see, hostile attitudes 
were prevalent before this happened. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, estimates 
of the modest numbers of workers (13,000) arriving in Britain post accession were 
wildly wrong 4 (Dustmann et al.  2003 ) and were spectacularly eclipsed by the arrival 
of 1.5 million migrants EU8 from 2004 until 2011. 
 The Conservative-led Coalition government, elected in May 2010, had pledged 
to bring down net migration to tens of thousands, that is the level of the 1990s. 
However its only room for manoeuvre was with non-EU migrants, where it has 
tightened regulations for skilled labour migration and abolished the ability for the 
highly skilled to enter without a job offer. Less skilled jobs had already been 
reserved for EU workers under the Points Based System. Students, who count as 
migrants, have been very hard hit as have family migrants of both UK citizens and 
permanent residents through the income requirements introduced in July 2012. The 
Government also could not control the level of emigration, which is part of the net 
migration fi gure, except to the extent of not renewing work permits of those already 
in the country; hence the restrictions placed on moving from temporary to perma-
nent residence permits for skilled migrants and intra-company transferees, which 
now depend on the level of income. 
 The national media and many politicians pointed out the fact that EU migration 
could not be controlled almost as a shocking revelation. By 2012 it was estimated 
that about 872,000 A8 migrants were resident in the UK. The tabloids took this as 
the cue for employing their favourite liquid metaphors of fl oods, deluges, inunda-
tions, swamps, and streams, not to mention hordes and invasions, to describe the 
new arrivals from Eastern Europe (Fox et al.  2012 ). Subsequently, the ending of the 
transitionary period for Bulgarian and Romanian migrants generated another moral 
panic over ‘tidal fl oods of new immigrants’. The Telegraph, a right-wing newspa-
per, warned that “Britain [is] powerless to stop tens of thousands of Bulgarians and 
Romanians moving to UK”. The Sun, a populist tabloid, talked about “Romanian 
and Bulgarian immigrants … threatening to swamp Britain – and fl ood our over-
stretched jobs market”. A Government e-petition implied that as many as 600,000 
people could come, often to seek benefi ts (cited in Duvell  2013 ). A number of stud-
ies suggesting that potential emigration from these countries was fairly limited were 
dismissed (Duvell  2013 ). 
4  Dustmann maintains that his estimate was based on the assumption that Germany in particular 
would open its borders, at least partially (Lowther  2013 ). 
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 Hostility to immigration is not new and was high even before the large scale 
immigration from accession countries in 2004. According to the British Social 
Attitudes Survey (Park et al.  2012 ), the proportion of respondents favouring some 
reduction in migration rose from 63 % in 1995 to 72 % in 2003 (with 40 % wishing 
to see a substantial reduction). The fi gure increased to 78 % in 2008, just before the 
beginning of the economic crisis. Attitudes among the British public had grown 
increasingly polarised between 2002 and 2011, with those who were educated being 
more comfortable with immigration compared to those with little education. The 
polarisation was more evident on views about the economic impact of immigration. 
Economically and socially insecure groups had become dramatically more hostile 
although all groups had become at least somewhat more negative about the cultural 
effects of migration. On the other hand, even for those who were generally negative 
towards immigration, skilled professional migrants were acceptable. 
 Although the main target of UK anti-immigration discourse are EU-migrants in 
general – with those from Poland and, increasingly, Romania and Bulgaria usually 
identifi ed as the main example – more recently members of UKIP started to make 
specifi c reference to Southern European migrants. A party spokesman stated that 
“What we are seeing is a continued huge infl ux from eastern Europe now being 
supplemented by a sharp rise in immigration from southern Europe as citizens from 
countries like Portugal and Spain fi nd that the only way to escape the eurozone 
nightmare is to vote with their feet” (BBC 16 November 2014). 
10.5.1  Controversies Around Free Movement of Labour 
 The growing anti-immigration sentiments in the mainstream political discourse has 
always been juxtaposed – when not confl ated – with a criticism of the EU system of 
free-movement and, more generally, with Euro-sceptic stances. The infl ated fi gures 
and scare stories used by the tabloid papers sustained the growing popularity of far 
right and anti-immigrant parties and particularly of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), founded in 1993 by members of the cross-party Anti- 
Federalist League, a political party set up in November 1991. Its aim was to fi eld 
candidates opposed to the Maastricht Treaty whose main primary objective was the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. It is now led by Nigel 
Farage. Its anti-immigration rhetoric obscures sharply contradictory economic poli-
cies from the ultra-liberal favouring further privatisation to more pragmatic posi-
tions retaining social institutions, such as the National Health Service (Wigmore 
 2014 ). It did well in the 2013 elections but it was in the European election of May 
2014, that UKIP received the largest number of votes (27.5 %) and gained 24 repre-
sentatives. In October 2014 it was the fi rst time in a century that neither the 
Conservatives nor Labour had won the largest number of votes in a nation-wide 
election. It gained its fi rst elected Member of Parliament through a by-election for 
the seat of Clacton, a feat repeated in November 2014 in the constituency of 
Rochester and Strood. Both by-elections were triggered by the defection of 
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Conservative MPs who had joined UKIP. This process has put increasing pressure 
not only on the Conservative Party, which already encompasses a strong Eurosceptic 
current, but also on the other political parties. 
 As from early 2013 David Cameron had promised – in case of a victory in the 
2015 elections – a referendum on British membership of the European Union, fol-
lowing a period of renegotiation with the EU. In the meantime, he announced 
increasing restrictions on welfare rights for EU migrants – stretching current 
European treaties as far as possible. 
 The Liberal Democrats, the coalition partner in the previous government and, 
traditionally, the most pro-European British party, have moved from a pro- 
immigration position to one which supports restrictions on the right to free move-
ment of future entrants as well as restrictions for new entrants coming as 
self-employed (Mason  2014 ). Nevertheless the then party leader Nick Clegg reiter-
ated that freedom of movement among EU states was “a good thing” – although it 
was “never intended as an automatic right to claim benefi ts” – and was opposed to 
leaving the EU which would strike an “immense” blow to UK prosperity. 5 
 However Clegg also supported Cameron’s proposals (The Guardian 29 July 
2014) to restrict access to benefi ts for Jobs Seekers Allowance, child benefi ts and 
child tax credits to 3 months instead of 6 months as from November 2014, and that 
this would only begin after the individual had been in the UK for 3 months. Reports 
from the BBC suggested that ‘at most’ 10,000 people would be affected. It would 
be unlikely to affect EU workers in the UK who lose their job after having made 
National Insurance contributions and would be limited mainly to those arriving here 
in the fi rst instance (Grove-White  2014 ). This measure refl ected the attempt by 
political parties to push the idea that the UK is a welfare magnet, but for which the 
Migration Advisory Committee ( 2014 ) states there is no evidence. 
 The Labour Party also strove to show how tough it had become and argued that 
EU migrants should only be able to access welfare payments if they have paid 
national insurance. The party in government had been accused of allowing uncon-
trolled immigration through its immediate opening up to migrants from accession 
countries. As a response to the Conservative’s attempt to make immigration a major 
issue in 2007, Gordon Brown launched the slogan ‘British jobs for British workers’ 
at the annual Trades Union Conference (Daily Telegraph 11 September 2007). He 
had also pledged to make EU migrants learn English which it was estimated would 
reduce the immigration of the less skilled by about a third. 
 In 2014, Mark Leonard, Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, 
said Labour should push for EU governments to issue social insurance cards to 
more easily control access to welfare, restrict some benefi ts for EU migrants for at 
least a year, and make language tests compulsory for new arrivals. Hence, as UKIP 
gained ground, Labour sought to toughen its stance, and though not turning its back 
on free movement, proposed clamping down on tax credits claimed by working EU 
migrants. The then shadow work and pensions secretary, Rachel Reeves, stated that 
5  Clegg urges restrictions on new EU migrants, BBC 5 August 2014-08-19  http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-politics-28638493 
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the UK social security was not designed for the current level of immigration. 6 She 
has thus proposed an increase to 2 years of contributions, which was more than the 
3 months announced by the Conservatives. Labour had also raised the possibility of 
not paying in work tax credits (for low income households) to EU migrant. 
 It should be remembered that, whilst competence for the coordination of social 
security schemes is ‘shared’ between the EU and Member States, Member States 
have exclusive competence for the design, organisation and funding of their social 
security systems which differ extensively. Within the overarching EU framework, 
they are free to decide who is entitled to be insured, which benefi ts are granted and 
under what conditions, and how benefi ts are calculated. 
 In summer 2014 Cameron (28 July) had also hit out against EURES – the 
European ‘Job Mobility Portal, since of the 2.4 million jobs posted on its web-site, 
over 1.1 million were in the UK. Jobs at UK fi rms including supermarket chains 
Tesco and Sainsbury’s are automatically advertised on the site. In future, jobs will 
only be uploaded to the website if an employer specifi cally requests that the position 
is offered across the EU. Thus Cameron stated (28 July 2014) “So we are banning 
overseas-only recruitment – legally requiring these agencies to advertise in English 
in the UK … and massively restricting this, aiming to cut back the vacancies on this 
portal by over 500,000 jobs” and therefore make easily accessible knowledge about 
job vacancies in the UK. 
 In their repeated attempts to outdo each other in terms of fi rmness on EU migra-
tion policies, British political parties are moving the bar further and further. 
Following his re-election, the former Conservative politician and now UKIP mem-
ber of Parliament, Mark Reckless, suggested that EU migrants currently living in 
the UK might be asked to leave the country under certain conditions, should his 
party be in Government. Although this statement was offi cially rejected by party 
leader Farage, it gave an indication of the extent to which every aspect of EU mobil-
ity had become the object of political discussions and central to the results of the 
parliamentary elections of May 2015, as well as the outcome of the referendum on 
whether the UK should leave the European Union on 23 June 2016. 
 According to an IPSOS-Mori poll conducted late June/early July 2015 (Nardelli 
 2015 ), freedom of movement had become the most contentious issue, and was 
 heavily orienting the vote. The majority of British (60 %) thought that freedom of 
movement should be restricted with 70 % of respondents saying that it was due to 
pressure on public services, 59 % the number coming to the UK to claim benefi ts, 
and 55 % pressure on housing. If it were not limited, the proportion who said that the 
UK should stay in the EU dropped 16 percentage points from 52 % to 36 %, while the 
vote to get out rose by 12 points from 31 % to 43 %. Relatively few (16 %) thought 
that freedom of movement should be kept as it is or with no controls (Nardelli  2015 ). 
Amongst the most popular measures to tackle the perceived problems of free move-
ment was the proposal to place restrictions on EU migrants claiming benefi ts together 
with broader restrictions to access welfare. These elements were at the centre of the 
6  No recourse to public funds applies to non EU migrants who do not have access to a range of 
non-contributory benefi ts until they gain permanent residence i.e. minimum of 5 years. 
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David Cameron’s negotiations with the European Commissionfor a ‘new settlement 
for the UK in a reformed EU’ ahead of the Brexit referendum. This was not seen as 
suffi cient and in the ensuing referendum 51.9 % voted to leave. 
10.6  Conclusions 
 The large-scale immigration of Eastern and more recently Southern Europeans to 
the UK has progressively fed increased hostility towards immigrants and contrib-
uted to the popularity of curbs on free movements and access to welfare. The fi lling 
of low skilled labour from these countries has contributed in particular to such calls. 
However the analysis of quantitative data seems to show that the Italians and Spanish 
in particular are not fi lling the less skilled sectors in the same way as Polish migrants 
have done. They are geographically more concentrated in the large urban centres 
which have long experience of immigration, both of labour migrants and asylum 
seekers and refugees. Even within the lower level service sector, they are often 
working in the hospitality sector and are less likely to be seen as being in competi-
tion with less educated local populations. 
 As has been commented, the current immigration debate demonstrates the loss of 
statistical reasoning. Following a period of large scale immigration from Eastern 
Europe, confl ict over competition in employment, pressure on public services and 
access to welfare have been the issues which have led to increased hostility towards 
immigration aired in the media and increasingly taken up by political parties across 
the spectrum apart from the Greens and the Scottish Nationalist Party. According to 
IPSOS-Mori ( 2014 ) immigration has become the single most important issue of 
concern to the British public and ended up becoming the major issue in the vote to 
leave the European Union, even in areas with low levels of immigration. The results 
of the referendum, which saw a high turnout, revealed profound polarisation, with 
those with lower educational qualifi cations, older people and those living in provin-
cial England, more likely to vote in favour of leave. Outside of London, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland were the only two areas to vote in favour of remaining in the 
EU (Ford  2016 ). The Brexit vote opens up a period of economic and political 
 insecurity and constitutional instability with unpredictable outcomes for the status 
of EU migrants currently in the UK and for the future of intra-European migration. 
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